While the absence of Russian President Vladmir Putin from the G20 Summit was expected, it is the decision of Chinese President Xi Jinping to have no show – instead sending Premier Li Qiang as the head of the Chinese delegation – that may have come as a surprise. This is more so, given the recent spurt of bonhomie with the bilateral meeting of Prime Minister Modi and Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in South Africa, after the near freeze on leadership-level interactions post the developments in Eastern Ladakh in the summer of 2020. While speculations have ranged from Xi’s health to unsubstantiated claims of reprimand by the elders of Communist Party of China (CPC), and difficult phase in the Chinese economy, his conscious and well thought decision to keep away is a downgrade, in spite of all the spin imparted by officials in the Indian government. In fact, just to make sure that his absence in Delhi is not seen to be on purpose, Xi also decided to miss the 43rd ASEAN Summit and 18th East Asia Summit in Jakarta, with Li Qiang again heading the Chinese delegation.
While it is a fact that the Chinese economy post the pandemic and zero-Covid measures is experiencing a crisis, the Communist Party-state under Xi has not necessarily let domestic challenges to overwhelm and constrain their external engagements. Consider China’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Essentially, it is a sign of how the CPC (presently) views India – another ambitious rising power – and its status as a global player, which is clearly not on equal terms. A recent appropriate illustration for this is in Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson’s response in April this year, on India eventually overtaking China on population, by emphasising quality (suzhi) over quantity. Immersed in meritocracy and superiority of some sections of individuals over others, the discourse of Suzhi has often been used by urban Chinese to denigrate their rural counterparts, thereby rendering the latter as second-class citizens. Its usage in official discourse by the foreign ministry lends legitimacy in characterizing, and racially profiling other countries.
The unwillingness of the Chinese Party-state to accord an equal status to India stems from their calculation of the world in zero-sum terms, wherein its rivalry/competition with the USA is the only contradiction that requires attention. Its objection to the inclusion of the Sanskrit term, ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ in the G20 documents, especially the joint communique at the end, citing precedence in not employing phrases from the language(s) or culture of nations holding the forum’s presidency previously, is the need to avoid any Indian philosophical imprints that embellishes their status, and also puts India on the same civilisational pedestal which China alone seeks to occupy.
The Chinese Party-state finds it discomforting to be in multilateral forums and groupings where it cannot hold the narrative, have some grip on the proceedings and decisively shape the contours of the debate. Just like India’s non-participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) despite multiple invitations by China, wherein the latter holds all the levers of control. Given that Modi would hold centrestage at the summit and there would also be inevitable attention drawn on the continuing standoff at the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh with Xi’s presence, he would not be amenable to such a state of play. Hence, a combination of factors and lack of incentives available that may explain why Xi has chosen to downgrade China’s participation at the G20 Summit.
This is also an opportune occasion to look at China’s role in multilateral fora, and the kind of fora increasingly chosen by it for its engagements. Whether it be specific arrangements like Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States over the years, or forums like BRICS or Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has sought to project itself as the leader of Global South posing an alternative to the US-led West. Not that India itself is not immune to such arrangements altogether but the scale at which the Chinese Party-state operates is with the desire to shape things in its own image. This is also visible in how China keeps reiterating the Community of Shared Futures, which is a formulation by Xi Jinping. The recent expansion of the BRICS membership also has China’s sharp imprint upon it. Further, China’s three new initiatives namely, the Global Civilizational Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Security Initiative, seek to diversify or consolidate – depending on how one views it – the decade-long BRI, showcasing its global outreach and engagement. In such an arrangement, China’s endeavour is to undermine the G20 in its own way, and in the process, also puncture any possible comparisons with India.
(The author wishes to thank Dr. Jabin T. Jacob, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi NCR, for borrowing some of his ideas while drafting this piece.)
(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)
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