The Indo-Pak War of 1971 began on December 3, and within a week, the top brass in the US was contemplating strategies to give India a bloody nose.
This betrayal by the United States came to light in 2005 when America’s National Security Archive (NSA) released a series of classified documents contained by the State Department.
The documents revealed how USA’s attitude towards the Indo-Pak war was shaped by its desire to bury the hatchet with communist China.
Many believe Washington DC wanted to protect Pakistan’s interests at any cost during the 1971 war as it sought Islamabad’s help in setting in motion its ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’ with Beijing.
Apparently, it was Pakistan’s Yahya Khan who helped arrange the notable 1972 visit to China by Richard Nixon, the then US president. It was not merely a coincidence that the visit came just months after the Indo-Pak war ended on December 16.
In the 1970s, the US viewed South Asia through the prism of the ultimate superiority of the US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan had to be reinforced as it was necessary to demonstrate to China that the US never leaves its allies hanging when push comes to shove.
The documents revealed by security archives indicated how Henry Kissinger, the then US National Security Advisor (NSA), viewed India as a Soviet “stooge” and a force that needed to be kept in check to save ally Pakistan.
On December 8, both Nixon and Kissinger agreed to dispatch planes to Pakistan. They also sent an aircraft carrier and other naval forces in the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India which was “supported by Soviet arms.”
On December 10, the duo reportedly involved China in their discussion. Kissinger subtly encouraged China to take military action against India in return for security guarantees should the Soviets ever invade.
“If the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic,” Kissinger was quoted as saying in the documents.
The US defined the Indo-Pak war as a crisis in South Asia aimed at weakening its ally Pakistan and orchestrated by the Soviets and their ally India.
The US-Pakistan relationship was so vital to Nixon that his administration even downplayed the reports of the ongoing genocide in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) even as its consular office in Dacca (now Dhaka) privately criticised the attitude.
Astonishingly, while the US administration in 1971 encouraged China to act against India, it also assured India of military support in case China engages on its northern frontier in the Himalayas.
A Times of India report from 2011 showed communications between the Indian embassy in Washington and the government in New Delhi. It highlighted how the US offered India “all out” help if China were to enter the Indo-Pak standoff to favour its all-weather friend.
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Indian ambassador to the US in 1971, LK Jha reported to New Delhi after having a meeting with Kissinger, “He (Kissinger) said that in a 1962 type of situation, US will not hesitate to give all-out help to India against China, and there is no change of position on this.”
Not just that, a few weeks back, Kissinger told the then-Indian Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, “I might tell you that we would take a very grave view of any Chinese move against India.”
The declassified documents also revealed how Kissinger viewed the Indian leadership. In November 1971, a month before the war, India’s then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Washington DC. Her motive was to urge the US to step up efforts to stop the ongoing genocide in East Pakistan against nationalist Bengalis.
When Indira left the US, Kissinger reportedly said, “Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there [in Bangladesh] … While [Indira Gandhi] was a bitch, … she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception.”
Although the US was itself sceptical of China’s capabilities to attack India, it just wanted to pile pressure on the Indian forces.
Kissinger and Nixon were soon informed that China was not prepared militarily to cause a headache for India. USA’s sources in Beijing confirmed that China would urge both warring sides to exercise restraint and nothing more than that.
China’s then Defence Minister Lin Biao had just died in September 1971 during a trip to Mongolia, and the Chinese didn’t want to jump straight into the hellfire just to serve American interests.
A few days later, Pakistan surrendered in Dhaka.
